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INTRODUCTION 
Today the specter of employment-related claimsl haunts cor­
porate board rooms throughout the country. The pervasiveness of 
such claims, and the large awards that have been made to claim­
ants,2 have led employers of all types to seek insurance coverage for 
employment-related claims under many different types of liability 
policies. Corporate policyholders often mistakenly assume that 
they must bear the full costs of the defense and liabilities of an em­
ployment-related suit. In fact, when applying policy language and 
well-established rules of insurance law, many courts have found in­
surance coverage for defense costs or liabilities associated with em­
* James E. Scheuermann and John K. Baillie are attorneys at the law firm of 
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, LLP, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where they counsel and liti­
gate on behalf of policyholders concerning insurance coverage matters. This Article 
reflects the views of the authors as to the identification of important issues in third­
party liability coverage for employment-related claims but does not necessarily reflect 
their views as to the resolution of these issues. Moreover, this Article does not neces­
sarily reflect the views of any client of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, LLP, or the firm itself. 
Portions of this chapter previously appeared in James E. Scheuermann, Insurance 
Coverage for Employment-Related Claims, 28 TORT & INS. L. J. 778 (1993), and in 
James E. Scheuermann & John K. Baillie, Liability Insurance for Employment-Related 
Claims, in llB THE LAW OF LlABlUTY INSURANCE (Rowland H. Long ed. Matthew 
Bender 1995). Both of these articles comprehensively discuss liability insurance cover­
age for employment-related claims. The portions that appeared in THE LAW OF LIABIL· 
ITY INSURANCE are reprinted with the permission of Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. © 
1995. All rights reserved. 
1. As used in this Article, "employment-related" generically refers to liabilities, 
acts, or claims arising in connection with employment discrimination, wrongful termina­
tion, constructive discharge, sexual harassment, and similar conduct. It does not refer 
to liabilities and claims for work-related injuries that may be covered under workers' 
compensation statutes. 
2. See, e.g., Shoney's Inc.: Judge Approves Settlement of Racial Bias Lawsuit, 
WALL ST. J., January 26,1993, at B4 (reporting that a U.S. district court judge approved 
a $105 million settlement in a racial discrimination suit against Shoney's, Inc.). 
71 
72 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:71 
ployment-related claims under liability insurance policies, including 
commercial general liability ("CGL") insurance policies? employ­
ers' liability ("EL policies" or "EL coverages"), as well as errors 
and omissions ("E&O") insurance policies. 
This Article examines the key issues that arise under EL and 
E&O insurance coverages in the specific context of employment­
related claims. The following section focuses on the five principal 
issues that arise under a typical grap.t of EL insurance coverage and 
examines two exclusions that are often included in EL policies and 
which are of special importance in the employment-related claims 
context. Section III examines three key issues that arise under 
E&O policies in the context of employment-related claims. 
I. COVERAGE FOR EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CLAIMS 

UNDER EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY POLICIES 

EL coverages are intended to complement both Workers' 
Compensation ("WC") coverages4 and general liability insurance 
coverages. A classic description of the interlocking and comple­
mentary nature of these coverages is found in Federal Rice Drug 
Co. v. Queen Insurance CO.:5 
The insuring agreements of the Workmen's Compensation and 
Employer's Liability Policy are designated to meet the situation 
created by the commonly enacted workmen's compensation stat­
utes. Under most of these statutes an employee has a theoretical 
election either to be covered by the statute, thereby obtaining the 
benefit of its absolute liability but accepting its limitations on 
payment, or to reject coverage and rely on the employer's com­
3. For an examination and analysis of issues arising in this context under a variety 
of liability insurance policies, see James E. Scheuermann & John K. Baillie, Liability 
Insurance for Employment-Related Claims, in THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
(Rowland H. Long ed., Matthew Bender 1995). . 
4. Workers' compensation schemes generally provide cash benefits to eligible em­
ployees that are injured accidentally on the job and are unable to work as a result, and 
to recompense them for their lost wages and medical benefits. Typically, the remedy 
provided by the applicable workers' compensation scheme is the only remedy that an 
employee may seek against his employer for injuries that are covered under that 
scheme. In many states, employers are required or permitted to fund potential work­
ers' compensation liabilities by purchasing Workers' CompensationlEmployers' Liabil­
ity ("WC/EL") insurance policies. 7B J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 
§ 4571 at 4-5 (West 1979 & Supp. 1994). Employees' claims of negligent and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress are preempted by the workers' compensation system in 
some states. E.g., La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 36 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 100, 884 P.2d 1048 (1995). 
5. 463 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1972) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
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mon law liability. Coverage A of the standard Workmen's Com­
pensation and Employer's Liability Policy insures against liability 
to those employees who elect for Workmen's Compensation Act 
coverage ... Coverage B of the Workmen's Compensation and 
Employer's Liability Policy insures against liability to employees 
who would be covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act ex­
cept for the fact that they elected against coverage. That this is 
the case is clear from the use of the language "arising out of and 
in the course of his employment." These words ... are those 
used in the workmen's compensation statutes of a majority of the 
states. The same language is used in exclusion (g) of the insurer's 
Comprehensive Business Policy, and undoubtedly is intended to 
have the same meaning. We read exclusion (f) to exclude liabil­
ity to covered employees electing for workmen's compensation 
and exclusion (g) to exclude liability to covered employees elect­
ing against workmen's compensation and we read the exclusions, 
therefore as coextensive. Together they are intended to exclude 
only such claims as would fall within the coverage of a standard 
Workmen's Compensation and Employer's Liability Policy.6 
In Federal Rice, the estate of a fonner employee of the insured 
who, "committed suicide in the insured's place of business by hang­
ing himself" two weeks after his dismissal, sued the employer for 
wrongful death, alleging that the insured's president had, over the 
course of three years, harassed and humiliated -the deceased em­
ployee to such an extent that his emotional distress deprived him of 
the capacity to govern his own conduct and resist an insane suicidal 
impulse? The employer sought coverage under its comprehensive 
business insurance policy, but its insurer denied coverage based on 
the policy's employers liability exclusion and workers compensation 
exclusion.8 The court described the complementary and interlock­
6. Id. at 629-30 (citations omitted). 
7. See id. at 627-28. 
8. Id. at 628. The specific grant of coverage at issue in Federal Rice provided: 

COVERAGE A - BODILY INJURY LIABILITY: 

To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become le­

gallyobligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, 

including death at any time reSUlting therefrom, sustained by any person [and 

caused by accident]. 

Id. 
The bracketed language was deleted by an endorsement to the policy. The exclu­
sions at issue in Federal Rice barred coverage: 
(f) under coverage A, to any obligation for which the insured or any carrier as 
his insurer may be held liable under any workmen's compensation, unemploy­
ment, compensation or disability benefits law, or under any similar law; 
(g) under coverage A, except with respect to liability assumed by the insured 
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ing nature of these coverages9 and hinged its coverage analysis on 
whether the underlying claim would be cognizable under the appli­
cable workers' compensation law: "If it would, there is no cover­
age. If it would not, neither exclusion (f) nor exclusion (g) applies, 
and there is coverage under Coverage A of the insuring agree­
ments. "10 The court found that exclusions did not bar coverage for 
the underlying claim because the emotional distress which allegedly 
caused the employee's suicide was not an "accident," and thus not 
covered under the applicable workers' compensation law.!1 
A. The Scope of the Coverage Grant 
EL coverage typically provides, "[the insurer will] pay on be­
half of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury by accident or 
disease ... sustained ... by any employee of the insured arising out 
of and in the course of his employment."12 EL policies may also 
include a defense obligation, created by language such as the fol­
lowing: "We have the right and duty to defend, at our expense any 
under a contract as defined herein, to bodily injury or to sickness, disease or 
death of any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of em­
ployment by the insured. 
ld. 
9. The Federal Rice court reviewed "standard" WC and EL grants of coverage for 
the purposes of comparison with the WC and employment exclusions in the policy at 
issue. The "standard" WC grant of coverage quoted by the court provided: 
COVERAGE A - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
To pay promptly when due all compensation and other benefits required of 
the insured by the workmen's compensation law. 
Id. at 629 n.2. The "standard" EL grant of coverage quoted by the court provided: 
COVERAGE B - EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY 
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become le­
gally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury by accident or dis­
ease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained in the United 
States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada by any employee of 
the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured 
either in operations in a state designated in item 3 of the declarations or in 
operations necessary or incidental thereto. 
Id. 	at 629 n.3. 
to. ld. at 630. 
11. 	 Id. at 630-31. 
12. See, e.g., Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc., 23 F.3d 970, 979 
(6th Cir.) (alterations in original) (construing Ohio law), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 190 
(1994); cf Commercial Union Insurance Company, Workers Compensation and Em­
ployers Liability Insurance Policy WC 00 ()() ()() A at 2 (August 1991) (providing cover­
age for "bodily injury" that "arise[s] out of and in the course of ... employment," 
subject to a number of other terms and conditions) [hereinafter Commercial Union 
Policy]. 
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claim, proceeding or suit against you for damages payable by this 
insurance."13 
These coverage grants give rise to five principal issues in the 
context of employment-related claims: (i) what qualifies as "bodily 
injury"; (ii) whether the acts giving rise to employment-related 
claims qualify as "accidents"; (iii) whether the amounts assessed 
against employers as the result of such claims are "damages"; (iv) 
who qualifies as an employee of the insured; and (v) whether em­
ployment-related claims "arise out of and in the course of 
employment. " 
1. Bodily Injury Coverage 
Sample form EL policies do not define the key policy term 
"bodily injury."14 Accordingly, under hornbook rules of construc­
tion, the term should be given its common ordinary meaning, and 
any vagueness, confusion, or ambiguity arising out of the failure to 
define the term should be resolved in favor of coverage for the poli­
cyholder.15 Since EL policies use the term "bodily injury" in their 
coverage grant in a manner similar to that of the standard-form 
Comprehensive or Commercial General Liability ("CGL") insur­
ance policies, a review of the issues arising under the "bodily in­
jury" coverage of CGL policies is instructive. 
In the 1993 revisions to the standard form CGL insurance pol­
icy "bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury, sickness or disease 
sustained by a person, including death resulting from any of these at 
any time."16 Many of the allegations of an employment-related 
complaint typically will not fall within the bodily injury coverage, 
e.g., allegations of breach of contract. The most common issue 
under a "bodily injury" coverage provision in employment-related 
coverage actions is whether emotional or mental distress is within 
the scope of "bodily injury" when there are no accompanying physi­
cal symptoms. 
Policyholders in employment-related coverage cases and other 
13. Commercial Union Policy, supra note 12, at 3 (August 1991). 
14. Id. 
15. 13 J. ApPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRAcrICE, §§ 7384 at 70-74, 7401 at 197, 
219-27 (West 1976). 
16. Insurance Services Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form 
CG 00 01 10 93 (1993), reprinted in S. MILLER & P. LEFEBVRE, I MILLER'S STANDARD 
INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 417 (1986 & Supp. 1994). The definition of "bodily 
injury" in the 1973 ISO standard form Comprehensive General Liability insurance pol­
icy, which is the subject of most of the case law, is materially identical. See id. at 451.2. 
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coverage cases often argue that the bodily injury coverage includes 
claims for infliction of emotional or mental distress, even if not ac­
companied by physical symptomsP This strategy may be worth 
pursuing in an employment-related coverage -action, even when 
emotional or mental distress claims do not represent significant lia­
bilities for a policyholder. The potential for coverage for a claim of 
emotional or mental distress under the bodily injury coverage will 
typically activate the policy's broad duty to defend,18 which may 
involve coverage for significant defense costs. 
Many courts, including the highest courts of New York and 
South Carolina, have found the policyholders' position persua­
sive.19 A slightly greater number of courts have rejected the policy­
holders' position and have held that purely emotional or mental 
distress claims are not within the bodily injury coverage.20 
17. E.g., Lavanant v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 79 N.Y.2d 623, 595 
N.E.2d 819 (1992) (holding that purely emotional injuries sustained by tenants as a 
result of ceiling collapse were covered under landlord's general liability policy). 
18. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southern Publishing Co., 894 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(applying Mississippi law and stating that under an EL policy the insurer's duty to de­
fend is triggered if there is any possibility of coverage under the allegations of the com­
plaint against the insured). 
19. Lavanant, 79 N.Y.2d 623,595 N.E.2d 819 (1992); County of Chemung v. Hart­
ford Casualty Ins. Co., 496 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. Super. Q. 1985); State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 297 S.c. 71, 374 S.E.2d 896 (1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Biggerstaff, 
703 F. Supp. 23 (D.S.C. 1989) (S. Carolina law); Ornark Indus., Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of 
Am., 590 F. Supp. 114 (D. Or. 1984) (Oregon law); Morrison Assurance Co. v. North 
Am. Reinsurance Corp., 588 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (Alabama law), affd, 760 
F.2d 279 (11th Cir. 1985); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. McGuire Co., 281 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Cal 
Ct. App.), rev. denied (1991); Abellon v. Hartford Ins. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Cal Ct. 
App.), rev. denied (1985); Bloodworth v. Carroll, 455 So. 2d 1197 (La. Ct. App. 1984), 
rev'd on other grounds, 463 So. 2d 1313 (La. 1985); Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v.' 
Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 594 A.2d 1079 (Me. 1991) (finding a duty to defend even 
though Maine law requires physical symptoms accompanying alleged emotional distress 
and complaint did not allege accompanying physical symptoms, on grounds that under­
lying plaintiff may prove such physical symptoms at trial); Loewenthal v. Security Ins. 
Co., 50 Md. App. 112, 436 A.2d 493 (1981). 
20. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. First Interstate Bancsystems, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 917 (D. 
Mont. 1988) (applying Montana law); West Am. Ins. Co. v. Bank of Isle of Wight, 673 F. 
Supp. 760 (E.D. Va. 1987) (applying Virginia Law); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell County Sch. Dist. No.1, 612 F. Supp. 285 (D. Wyo. 1985) (applying Wyoming 
law); Rolette County v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 452 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.D. 1978) 
(North Dakota law); Chatton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1992); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 244 Ga. 456, 260 S.E.2d 860 
(1979); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Diamant, 401 Mass. 654,518 N.E.2d 1154 (1988); Greenman 
v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 173 Mich. App. 88,433 N.w.2d 346 (1988); National Ben 
Franklin Ins. Co. v. Harris, 161 Mich. App. 86, 409 N.W.2d 733 (1987); Artcraft of N.H., 
Inc. v. Lumberman'S [sic] Mut. Casualty Co., 126 N.H. 844, 497 A.2d 1195 (1985); SL 
Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 188, 607 A.2d 1266 (1992) (but 
holding that ambiguity of "bodily injury" requires a case-by-case analysis of underlying 
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Perhaps the most striking aspect of the cases holding that 
"bodily injury" does not encompass emotional or mental distress 
when unaccompanied by any physical symptoms is that they rewrite 
the definition of "bodily injury." They equate "bodily" with "physi­
cal," and, moreover, read "bodily" as modifying. "sickness" and 
"disease," as well as "injury." "Bodily injury" is thus rewritten to 
mean "physical injury, physical sickness, or physical disease."21 
The plain language of the definition, however, does not use the 
term "physical" and uses "bodily" only to modify "injury." As the 
highest court of New York held, "[w]e decline [the insurer's] invita­
tion to rewrite the contract to add 'bodily sickness' and 'bodily dis­
ease' .... [The insurer] could itself have specified such limitations 
in drafting its policy, but it did not do SO."22 Rather, read as plainly 
written, "[t]he categories 'sickness' and 'disease' in the insurer's 
definition not only enlarge the term 'bodily injury' but also, to the 
average reader, may include mental as well as physical sickness and 
disease."23 
The same result is required by the plain and ordinary meaning 
of the terms in the definition of "bodily injury" and well-established 
rules of insurance policy construction. Common definitions of 
"sickness" and "disease" are broad enough to encompass purely 
mental or emotional illnesses or distress and not limited to physical 
sicknesses or diseases. "Sickness" is commonly broadly defined as 
"illness ... a weakened and disordered state of anything"24 or "in­
firmity ... indisposition ... malaise."25 Similarly, "disease" is com­
monly defined as "distress ... any departure from health; illness in 
general"26 or "distemper ... derangement ... breakdown."27 
Under the well-established rule of construction that undefined pol­
icy terms are to be given their common, ordinary meanings,28 
purely emotional distress claims should fall within either "sickness" 
or "disease" or both. 
facts}; E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 106 Wash. 2d 901, 726 
P.2d 439 (1986). . 
21. E.g., Rolette County, 452 F. Supp. at 130; Diamant, 401 Mass. at 658 n.3, 518 
N.E.2d at 1157 n.3; Artcraft, 126 N.H. at 846,497 A.2d at 1196; E-Z Loader Boat Trail­
ers, 106 Wash. 2d at 908,726 P.2d at 443. 
22. Lavanant, 79 N.Y.2d at 629, 595 N.E.2d at 822. 
23. ld. 
24. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DrcrIONARY 1685 (1983). 
25. DOUBLEDAY ROGET'S THESAURUS IN DlcrIONARY FORM 638 (rev. ed. 1987). 
26. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DrcrIONARY 523 (1983). 
27. DOUBLEDAY ROGET'S THESAURUS IN DrcrIONARY, FORM 194 (rev. ed. 
1987). 
28. E.g., ApPLEMAN, supra note 15, § 7384, at 70-74. 
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Moreover, it is black-letter insurance law that terms included 
in grants of coverage are to be interpreted broadly so as to provide 
the insured with the maximum coverage possible under the policy, 
and further, that ambiguous policy terms (i.e., those that have more 
than one reasonable interpretation) are to be construed in favor of 
coverage and against the insurer-drafter.29 Accordingly, the term 
"bodily injury," which is, at best, ambiguously defined in EL poli­
cies, should encompass emotional or mental distress even when un­
accompanied by physical symptoms.30 
In addition, the difficulties in distinguishing between physical 
and mental injuries should weigh the scales heavily in favor of find­
ing coverage. The question of whether an emotional injury is a 
bodily injury is a question of fact. "It involves a medical or psycho­
logical problem of proof rather than purely a question of law."31 
Recognizing just this point, courts otherwise inclined to find "bodily 
injury" unambiguous have also held that this term may be ambigu­
ous in light of certain facts or allegations and, accordingly, "should 
be analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the al­
leged injuries are sufficiently akin to physical injuries to render the 
term 'bodily injury' ambiguous. "32 
The case-by-case analysis is especially crucial in determining 
whether there is a duty to defend. Because this broad duty is acti­
vated if there is any potential liability covered under the policy,33 
the absence of a well-developed factual record as to the nature and 
extent of the claimant's alleged "bodily injuries" and the potential 
ambiguity of "bodily injury" in light of certain facts that may be 
developed should favor a finding of coverage for defense costS.34 
29. See id. § 7401, at 197,219-27; § 7405, at 340; accord, e.g., Kent v. Middlesex 
Mut. Assuran~ Co., 226 Conn. 427, 436 n.13, 627 A.2d 1319, 1324 n.13 (1993); Bateman 
v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 527 Pa. 241, 245, 590 A.2d 281,283 (1991). 
30. If further evidence of the ambiguity of "bodily injury" is needed, one need 
look no further than the case of University of Illinois v. Continental Casualty Co., 234 
III. App. 3d 340, 599 N.E.2d 1338 (1992), in which the defendant-insurer argued that 
claims of mental anguish and emotional distress fell within the policy's definition of 
"bodily injury" (i.e., "injury, sickness or disease") and accordingly were subject to an 
exclusion for damages arising from bodily injury. The court rejected this argument and 
found coverage for employment-related claims. Id. at 360-62, 599 N.E.2d at 1351-53. 
31. Abellon v. Hartford Ins. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 852, 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
32. SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 188,204,607 A.2d 
1266, 1274 (1992). 
33. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 275, 419 P.2d 168, 174-75 
(1966) (en banc). 
34. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Westchester Inv. Co., 721 F. Supp. 
1165, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (applying California law and denying insurer's motion for 
summary judgment on duty to defend under bodily injury coverage when evidence of 
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2. "Accident" 
EL policies' use of the undefined term "accident" in their 
grants of coverage raises an important issue that is likely to be cov­
erage-determinative in many cases involving employment-related 
claims: from whose standpoint is an "accident" determined? As 
with the undefined term "bodily injury," if any ambiguity or confu­
sion is created by the insurers' failure to define this term under 
black-letter rules of construction, it should be resolved in favor of 
coverage.35 
It is remarkable that this issue should even be the subject of 
litigation under the EL policy. The confusion as to the relevant 
perspective or standpoint was one of the factors leading to the 1966 
revision of the standard-form CGL policy from an "accident" basis 
(which also did not specify the relevant standpoint) to an "occur­
rence" basis (which did specify the relevant standpoint as being that 
of the insured).~6 Thus, the lesson learned by CGL insurers some 
thirty years ago appears to have been lost on contemporary EL in­
surers, dooming them (and their policyholders) to litigation over an 
ambiguous policy provision that could very easily have been made 
clear through more careful drafting. 
This omission has led to otherwise unnecessary litigation and a 
split of judicial authority on the issue. In EEOC v. Southern Pub­
lishing Co. ,37 two former employees of an EL policyholder alleged 
that another employee "was guilty of 'continued and persistent 
grabbing and touching of [one of the former employee's] private 
physical manifestations of alleged emotional distress was developed in deposition 
discovery}. 
35. See APPLEMAN, supra note 15, and accompanying text. 
36. See Norman Nachman, The New Policy Provisions for General Liability Insur­
ance, 18 THE ANNALS 197, 200 (1965) ("[A] number of cases have held, contrary to 
intent, that the unexpected nature of the injury is to be determined from the point of 
view of the injured party."); Lyman J. Baldwin, Jr., (Secretary-Underwriting of the In­
surance Company of North America), Address to the American Society of Insurance 
Management 1, 7 (Oct. 20, 1965) ("To the consternation of underwriters, a number of 
past court decisions have applie[d] the concept of fortuity from the point of view of the 
injured party. Such an unintended interpretation of coverage should not result from 
the new language."); Richard H. Elliott (Secretary of the National Bureau of Casualty 
Underwriters), The New Comprehensive General Liability Policy 1, 3 American Man­
agement Association (1966) ("To the consternation of underwriters, a number of past 
court decisions have applied the concept of fortuity from the point of view of the in­
jured party. Such an unintended interpretation of coverage should not result from the 
new language."). (lranscripts of these papers are on file with the authors.). 
37. 705 F. Supp. 1213 (S.D. Miss. 1988), aff'd, 894 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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parts'" and that he "had committed assault and battery" on them.38 
One of the employees also alleged that the policyholder's president 
had told her new employer that "she had sabotaged the office com­
puter."39 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commisssion 
("EEOC") brought claims fpr sexual harassment resulting in con­
structive and retaliatory discharge, and the two former employees 
intervened, alleging claims of slander and assault and battery.4o 
The insured argued that its insurer had a duty to defend the 
EEOC's harassment charges and the employees' tort claims under 
the terms of an EL policy.41 The district court noted that the policy 
did not define the term "accident" and did not define "from whose 
viewpoint actions claimed to be accidental should be evaluated."42 
The district court reasoned that "[w]hether or not the alleged as­
sault and battery may be appropriately characterized as an accident 
so as to bring. those claims within the ambit of coverage depends 
upon from whose standpoint the conduct is viewed."43 Citing state 
case law, and construing the ambiguity created by the policy's fail­
ure to specify from whose viewpoint "accident" was to be deter­
mined in favor of coverage for the policyholder, the district court 
concluded that the determination of whether an injury is "acciden­
tal" should be made from the injured person's perspective. Thus, 
"[i]f the injury comes to [the victim] through external force, not of 
[the victim's] choice or provocation, then as to [the victim] the in­
jury is accidental."44 . 
Applying this rule, the district court in Southern Publishing 
held that, from the victims' standpoint, their injury from the assault 
and battery was "accidental" because "the injury was the result of 
external force," and the victims did not choose or provoke their 
injury.45 Consequently, the court ruled that the EL policy poten­
tially covered the assault and battery claims but not the slander 
claim46 and found that the EL insurer had a duty to defend its poli­
cyholder against the assault and battery claims. The district court 
38. EEOC v. Southern Pub. Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting 
the fOrnler employees' complaint). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Apparently, the defendant did not argue for insurance coverage of the harass­
ment claim. 
42. Southern Publishing, 705 F. Supp. at 1217. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. (quoting Georgia Casualty Co. v. Alden Mills, 127 So. 555 (Miss. 1930». 
45. Id. at 1217-18. 
46. Id. at 1218. 
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found that there was no possibility of coverage for the slander claim 
under the policy's EL coverages because "certainly no bodily injury 
resulted from the alleged slander."47 The court of appeals reversed 
the district court's determination and found that the slander claims 
were covered under the "personal injury and advertising liability 
coverage" of the policy's general liability coverages. The court fur­
ther found that the district court had erred in finding that coverage 
for the slander claim was barred by the policy's exclusion for inten­
tional acts because the claim against the policyholder alleged negli­
gent slander as well as intentional slander.48 
The district court refused to award the policyholder all of the 
costs that it incurred in defending the action. Because the former 
employees' tort claims were determined to have been barred by the 
statute of limitations, the court was able to prorate the defense 
costs between those claims and the non-covered harassment claims, 
and did SO.49 
In Mary & Alice Ford Nursing Home, Co. v. Fireman's Insur­
ance CO.50 a New York appellate court reached a contrary holding 
on the "accident" issue addressed in Southern Publishing. In Mary 
& Alice Ford, the policyholder sought coverage for a discrimination 
claim based on disability under a general liability policy, an um­
brella liability policy, and an EL policy. Although the EL policy's 
coverage grant was worded similarly to the EL policy language at 
issue in Southern Publishing ,51 the Mary & Alice Ford court failed 
to recognize the ambiguity created by the language's failure to de­
fine from whose standpoint the discrimination had to be an "acci­
47. Ill. at 1219. 
48. EEOC v. Southern Publishing Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 785, 790-91 (5th Cir. 1990). 
49. Southern Publishing, 705 F. Supp. at 1219-20. Most courts have rejected this 
position. When a legal action against an insured for which the insured seeks a defense 
includes both covered and excluded claims, the insurer is required to defend the entire 
lawsuit. See, e.g., Alert Centre, Inc. v. Alarm Protection Servs., Inc., 967 F.2d 161, 163 
(5th Cir. 1992) (applying Louisiana law); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 17 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 210, 213-14, 846 P.2d 792, 795-96, (Cal. 1993); Ruder & Finn, Inc. v. Seaboard 
Sur. Co., 52 N.Y.2d 663, 669-70, 422 N.E.2d 518, 521 (1981); see also Heffernan & Co. v. 
Hartford Ins. Co., 418 Pa. 326, 331-32, 614 A.2d 295, 298 (1992) (finding that the duty to 
defend is triggered when the potential for a covered claim being made against the poli­
cyholder became apparent, even if the only claims which were actually ever made were 
excluded from coverage). The "suit" language in the EL policy provision is substan­
tially similar to the duty to defend language in the liability pOlicies at issue in the cases 
cited above. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
50. 446 N.Y.S.2d 599 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd, 57 N.Y.2d 656, 439 N.E.2d 883 
(1982). 
51. Compare Mary & Alice Ford, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 600 with Southern Publishing, 
705 F. Supp. at 1217. 
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dent." Despite the fact that the court noted that the "multifaceted 
term 'accident' is not given a narrow technical definition by the 
law,"52 it concluded that the "casualty" should be looked ~t "from 
the point of view of the insured, to see whether or not, from his 
point of view, it was unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen."53 
The court reasoned that the employee's alleged injuries "were 
unexpected and unforeseen by ... the insured" because they flowed 
"directly" from the insured's "intentional discriminatory prac­
tice."54 Accordingly, the court held that proof of discrimination 
would "necessarily establish that there was no accident within the 
meaning of the insurance policies in question," and hence the in­
surer was not obligated to defend or indemnify the employer.55 
Although the court's determination of "accident" from the 
point of view of the EL policyholder in Mary & Alice Ford effected 
a denial of coverage on the facts before the court, such a rule will 
often promote coverage in the context of employment-related 
claims. Often, employment-related claims are responses to the al­
leged discriminatory, harassing, or otherwise tortious acts of fellow 
employees who are without significant administrative or policymak­
ing authority within the corporate employer and who have acted 
without authority or the approval of the corporation. If the corpo­
rate insured's responsible effective management did not know of, 
condone, ratify, or consciously adopt such conduct, the conduct 
would still be an accident from the standpoint of the corporate poli­
cyholder.56 One of the principal reasons policyholders, especially 
large corporate policyholders, purchase liability insurance is to pro­
tect themselves from the unlawful acts of their employees. The fact 
that an employee acted with the intent to cause injury should not of 
itself necessarily bar the corporation from coverage. As the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized, pre­
cluding a policyholder from coverage whenever it is vicariously lia­
ble for an employee's conduct would ma~e "the comprehensive 
liability policy illusory for corporate purposes. "57 
52. Mary & Alice Ford, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 601 (citation omitted). 
53. Id. (relying on Miller v. Continental Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.2d 675, 358 N.E.2d 258 
(1976); McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.2d 358, 329 N.E.2d 172 (1975». 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Thrlock, 216 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804-05 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985); SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 188,213­
14, 607 A.2d 1266, 1279 (1992). 
57. Dart Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 484 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(applying California law); cf. Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Magic Years Learning Ctrs. 
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Only when the insured's responsible effective management 
knows of or condones unlawful discriminatory or harassing conduct 
should coverage be precluded for want of an "accident." For exam­
ple, in Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Insurance Co. ,58 no 
coverage was available for a former employee's claims of sexual 
harassment and wrongful termination against the policyholder, 
when the sexual harassment was allegedly perpetrated by the poli­
cyholder's president, and the president's "sexual misconduct with 
female employees was known to, and ratified by, the board of 
directors."59 
3. "As Damages" 
Insurers have attempted to deny coverage for back pay awards 
to employees by contending that these awards are an equitable 
remedy and hence that they are not covered "damages," i.e., mone­
tary relief awardable through an action at law triable to a jury. Sig­
nificantly, insurance companies themselves have rejected this 
argument when they, as policyholders, have sought coverage for 
their employment-related liabilities. In Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's,60 a federal district 
court, at the urging of the plaintiff, rejected the "hypertechnical dis­
tinction between damages and equitable relief" advanced by the de­
fendant-insurers, and determined that the term "damages" should 
be "construed in accord with the plain meaning of the term and the 
reasonable expectations of the insured."61 Accordingly, the court 
and Child Care, Inc., 45 F.3d 85, 89 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Texas law and determining 
that an individual employer's sexual harassment of an employee was "neither expected 
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured" within the meaning of a CGL policy's 
occurrence definition, even though that individual was one of three named insureds 
under the policy, because there was "no contention" that either of the other insureds 
expected or intended to injure the employee); Seminole Point Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna 
Casualty & Sur. Co., 675 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D.N.H. 1987) (The court held that there was 
no coverage for the corporation president's intentional sexual harassment of employ­
ees. However, the court found that the insurer was liable for defense costs for the 
president's employer, the hospital, because the president's acts were not authorized by 
or done for the benefit of the hospital, and the hospital faced independent liability for 
its negligence.); Streamline Bar, Inc. v. GRE Am., No. C9-93-451, 1993 WL 290276 
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1993) (finding coverage for an employer's vicarious liability for 
its employee's acts of sexual harassment). The drafting history of the "occurrence" 
language confirms and supports this argument. See Scheuermann & Baillie, supra note 
3, at § 11B.02[2][ a J[iH]. 
58. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, review denied, (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
59. Id. at 699. 
60. 650 F. Supp. 1553 (W.O. Pa. 1987) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
61. Id. at 1560. 
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found that the general liability insurance policies at issue provided 
coverage for back pay awards that the policyholder-insurer was re­
quired to pay to remedy discriminatory employment practices.62 
This holding is consistent with the vast majority of courts that have 
addressed the "damages" issue in environmental insurance cover­
age disputes.63 
In contrast, a distinct minority of courts have accepted the 
"hypertechnical distinction" between legal and equitable forms of 
relief advanced by insurers in the context of employment-related 
claims. Thus, in School District of Shorewood v. Wausau Insurance 
COS.,64 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin employed that distinction 
to defeat coverage for defense costs incurred in connection with a 
discrimination' claim seeking attorneys' fees and injunctive relief 
that would have required the policyholder to reorganize and adopt 
new hiring practices to remedy past discrimination. Contrary to 
overwhelming case law,65 the court reasoned: "[I]n the insurance 
context, the term 'damages' has an accepted technical meaning in 
law."66 Although the court acknowledged that the words in an in~ 
surance contract mean "not what the insurer intended the words to 
mean but what a reasonable person in the position of an insured 
would have understood the words to mean,"67 it disregarded that 
rule in adopting the technical distinction between law and equity.68 
62. Id. The "as damages" language which was at issue in Liberty Mutual is no 
different than the "as damages" language which typically appears in EL policies. 
Although there do not appear to be any cases construing such language in the specific 
context of an EL policy, the language should be construed similarly in favor of coverage 
regardless of the type of policy it appears in. 
63. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 799 P.2d 1253 (1990); 
Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Md. 758, 782, 625 A.2d 1021, 1033 
(1993); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 407 Mass. 689, 700; 
555 N.E.2d 576, 583 (1990); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869; 
886-87,784 P.2d 507,515 (1990); but see, e.g., Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 
573 A.2d 16, 18-19 (Me. 1990) (environmental remediation costs not "damages"). 
64. 170 Wis. 2d 347, 488 N.W.2d 82 (1992). 
65. Id. at 368 n.61 (citations omitted). 
66. Shorewood, 170 Wis. 2d at 367-68, 488 N.W.2d at 89. 
67. Id. 
68. Another case often cited by insurers to support their argument that "dam­
ages" means only "legal damages" in the context of employment-related claims, Mary­
land Cup Corp. v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 81 Md. App. 518, 568 
A.2d 1129 (1990), may no longer be good law in light of the opinion of Maryland's 
highest court in Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 330 Md. 758, 625 
A.2d 1021 (1993). In Maryland Cup, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals accepted 
the technical distinction between legal damages and equitable relief and denied cover­
age to a policyholder for claims made under Title VII alleging discriminatory employ~ 
ment practices urged on it by the insurer. Subsequently, Maryland's highest court 
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4. "Employee of the Insured" 
The "employee of the insured" language in the EL coverage 
grant gives rise to two issues: first, who is an "employee" and sec­
ond, who is the "insured." EL coverage will be forthcoming only if 
the underlying claim arises out of an employment relationship be­
tween the plaintiff and an insured employer. Courts have rejected 
EL policyholders' arguments that EL coverage exists for employ­
ment claims that arise outside of an employment relationship be­
tween an insured employer and its employees. For example, in 
Producers' Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Insurance Co. ,69 the Cali­
fornia Supreme Court determined that there was no possibility of 
coverage under a WCIEL policy that insured Producers Dairy and 
its subsidiary, LAS Corporation, for a negligence claim brought 
against Producers Dairy by an LAS employee who was injured on 
the job.7° The court reasoned that "Producers' liability to [the LAS 
employee] was not based on any employment relationship between 
them, but arose instead from Producers' negligent maintenance of 
its delivery truck"71 and explicitly declined to recognize that cover­
age might be available under the EL policy "when a negligence 
claim is made against an 'insured' (Producers), by an employee of 
~n 'insured' (LAS)."72 The court further reasoned: "[A] reasonable 
person in the position of an officer of Producers would not disre­
gard the fact that legally Producers and LAS were each separate 
entities, and accordingly that person would not assume coverage 
existed under Producers' employers' liability policy where the po­
tential plaintiff is not a Producers' employee."73 
Whether the claimant in the underlying case is an "employee" 
is a question which often will be determined by state law and stat­
utes.74 Courts in the various states have identified factors which are 
used to determine whether an employer-employee relationship ex­
ists. In Savoie v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. ,75 a Louisiana ap­
effectively, but sub silentio, rejected Maryland Cup's interpretation of "damages" and 
held that the equitable remedies that were sought by a state agency against an alleged 
polluter under the state's environmental laws and regulations were "damages" as that 
term appeared in the insured's general liability policy. See id. at 7fr2, 625 A.2d at 1033. 
69. 41 Cal. 3d 903, 718 P.2d 920 (1986). 
70. [d. at 907, 718 P.2d at 921. 
71. [d. at 913, 718 P.2d at 926. 
72. [d. at 911, 718 P.2d at 924. 
73. [d. at 913, 718 P.2d at 925. 
74. See 11 RONALD A. ANDERSON, CoUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 44.73, at 252 
(rev. ed. 19fr2 & Supp. 1995). 
75. 339 So. 2d 914 (La. Ct. App. 1976), affd, 347 So. 2d 188 (La. 1977). 
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pellate court determined that no employment relationship existed 
between two cousins (who were also neighbors) who frequently 
helped one another with farm work because neither one had the 
right to exercise any control over the other's actions; no wages were 
paid, nor was there any agreement for wages or compensation; and 
"[t]hey had no definite agreement with respect to what was actually 
being exchanged by the parties or the value thereof, nor was there 
any obligation between them in this connection."76 
Courts have split on the issue of whether unsuccessful job ap­
plicants who are injured during the application process or a tryout 
period are "employees."77 In jurisdictions where job applicants 
may be "employees," EL insurance coverage may be available for 
claims brought by applicants who allege that they have been dis­
criminated against on an impermissible basis in a hiring decision. 
5. "Arising Out of and in the Course of His Employment" 
For there to be coverage for an employment-related claim 
under an EL policy, the injury that is the subject of the claim must 
have arisen out of or occurred in the course of the claimant's em­
ployment. The issue created by such ambiguous language is that of 
determining the causal nexus between the employment and the al­
leged injury.78 . 
Under well-established rules of construction, grants of cover­
age are to be interpreted broadly and in favor of coverage,79 while 
restrictions and exclusions are to be interpreted narrowly and 
strictly against the insurer.80 Accordingly, the "arising out of" lan­
guage in the EL insurance coverage grant should be understood to 
76. Id. at 917. 
77. Compare Sellers v. City of Abbeville, 458 So. 2d 592, 593 (La. Ct. App. 1984) 
(denying workers' compensation to police officer who lost his job after failing a civil 
service test and was injured while warming up for an agility test in connection with his 
application for re-employment, because he was not an "employee" when injured), writ 
denied, 462 So. 2d 1248 (La. 1985) with Erickson v. Holland, 295 N.W.2d 576, 579-80 
(Minn. 1980) (awarding workers' compensation to truck driver injured while taking a 
performance test as part of a formal prerequisite for employment with a trucking firm, 
because the evidence in the record showed that the applicant would be (and was) paid 
for his time during the test and because he was under the control and supervision of the 
employer). 
78. The Supreme Court of Tennessee has recognized that the policy term "arising 
out of' is "extremely broad ... so broad, in fact, that it is difficult to conceive of a rule 
that draws a justifiable line between coverage and no coverage at any reasonable 
point." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watts, 811 S.W.2d 883, 887 (Tenn. 1991). 
79. See generally ApPLEMAN, supra note 15, § 7401, at 197. 
80. See id., § 7405, at 340. 
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encompass any bodily injury that has any type of causal nexus with 
the claimant's employment.81 Thus, while this coverage grant in­
cludes relations of proximate causation between the employment 
and the bodily injury, it is not limited to such causal relationships.82 
These principles are illustrated by Forum Insurance Co. v. Al­
lied Security, Inc.83 The underlying claim iIi Allied Security was 
brought against the employerlEL policyholder, Allied Security, by 
the estate of a former employee who was killed by another em­
ployee while both were on assignment for Allied Security.84 The 
jury in the underlying action determined that the deceased was 
killed for personal reasons "not directed against the victim as an 
employee or because of his employment."85 Allied Security's gen­
eral liability insurer, Forum Insurance Company, provided a de­
fense under a reservation of rights, and brought a declaratory 
judgment action against the employer's EL insurer, Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company, to establish Liberty Mutual's obligation to de­
fend and indemnify Allied Security.86 The existence of EL cover­
age hinged on whether the slain employee's death "[arose] out of 
and in the course of his employment by the insured. "87 The court 
determined that the EL policy language at issue was unambiguous 
as a matter of law and that "'[bJut for' causation, i.e., a cause and 
result relationship, is enough to satisfy this provision of the pol­
81. See, e.g., Lumbennens Mut. Casualty Co. v. S-W Indus., 23 F.3d 970, 979 (6th 
Cir.1994). 
82. Id. at 980. Another aspect of the policy language "arising out of and in the 
course of employment" also bears mention in the context of insurance coverage for 
employment-related claims. Applied properly, black-letter rules of policy interpreta­
tion would require the "arising out of and in the course of' language as used in the 
"employment exclusion" and sometimes included in general liability insurance policies 
to be construed to exclude coverage only when the employment relationship proxi­
mately causes the employee's claim. See generally Scheuennann & Baillie, supra note 
3, at § llB.02[2][i] n.66 and accompanying text. For a number of reasons, proximate 
causation may not exist in the context of an employment-related claim. Id. at llB-30­
31. Accordingly, coverage for an employment-related claim might be provided by both 
an employer's EL insurance and its general liability insurer, even if the latter is subject 
to an "employment exclusion." Cf, Eichelberger v. Warner, 290 Pa. Super. 269, 434 
A.2d 747 (1981) (construing "arising out of' broadly in the context of the grant of cov­
erage of a auto insurance policy and narrowly in the context of an exclusion in a home­
owner's policy and finding that coverage for liabilities associated with one accident was 
available under both policies). 
83. 866 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
84. Id. at 83. 
85. Id. at 81. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 81-82. 
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icy."88 Accordingly, the court found that the employee's death 
"clearly arose out of his employment ... since he was killed by a 
fellow employee while both were on assignment as security guards 
for their employer"89 and thus that Liberty Mutual was obligated to 
bear part of the cost of the defense of the claim against Allied Se­
curity, as the claim was potentially covered under Forum's policy as 
well as Liberty Mutual's policy.90 
The United States Court of Appealsfor the Sixth Circuit has 
held that under the coverage grant of an EL policy even an inten­
tional tort that an employer commits against an employee may 
"arise out of and in the course of" employment. In Lumbermens 
Mutual Casualty Co. v. S-W Industries, Inc. ,91 a worker, Carl Viock, 
contracted lung disease as the result of being exposed to toxic 
fumes and dust on the job. In Viock's tort action against his em­
ployer, the jury determined that the employer had acted with a 
"presumed intent," but not a specific intent, to injure Viock.92 The 
employer's EL insurers denied coverage, contending that "an inten­
tional tort by one's employer cannot possibly 'arise out of and in 
the course' of [one's] employment."93 The Sixth Circuit rejected 
that contention: 
It is undisputed that Viock's injuries were caused by his long 
term exposure to toxic chemicals and congestive dusts at his 
work. But for his job, there is no question that Viock would not 
have sustained these injuries. It strains credulity, therefore, for 
the appellee-insurers in this case to contend that these injuries 
did not "arise ou(of and in the course of" Viock's employment.94 
Accordingly, the court found coverage under the EL policies for 
Viock's claim.95 
B. Possible Applicable Exclusions 
EL policies may incorporate exclusions that in some circum-' 
stances may bar coverage wholly or in part for employment-related 
88. Id. at 82 (relying on McCabe v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 228 A.2d 901, 903 
(1967». 
89. Id. at 83. 
90. Id. at 85. 
91. 23 F.3d 970 (6th Cir.) (applying Ohio law), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 190 (1994). 
92. Id. at 973-74. 
93. Id. at 979. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 980. 
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claims. These include the employment exclusion and the contract 
exclusion. 
1. The EL Policy's Employment Exclusion 
EL policies often conta4t some form of employment exclusion. 
For example, an EL policy may contain an exclusion for" 'damages 
arising out of the ... discrimination against any employee in viola­
tion of law. "'96 The judicial response to such exclusions has· been 
mixed. 
Two cases which have found coverage for employment-related 
claims under EL policies despite such exclusions are worth discus­
sion. In EEOC v. Southern Publishing Co. ,97 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that an EL policy 
provided coverage for claims of assault and battery and "negligent 
slander" brought against an employer by two employees. The Fifth 
Circuit found that the allegations of "continued and persistent grab­
bing," "assault and battery," and "physical pain" that the employ­
ees suffered were sufficient to allege "bodily injury" under the 
policy.98 The court rejected the insurer's argument that the bodily 
injury claims were not covered because they were nothing more 
than evidence of alleged discrimination, and the policy excluded 
"'damages arising out of the discharge of, coercion of, or discrimi­
nation against any employee in violation of law."'99 The court ruled 
that the bodily injury claims were sufficiently distinct from the Title 
VII claims so as to not fall within this exclusion.loo With respect to 
the alleged slander of an employee by the employer, the court de­
termined that the policy provided coverage for slander unless it was 
intentional,1Ol Because the complaint against the employer alleged 
that the slander may have been "stated with gross and reckless dis- . 
regard of the truth," the policy provided coverage for the slander 
96. Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 729 
(Iowa 1993) (quoting the employer's liability policy issued by State Farm) (alterations 
in original) (determining that such an exclusion barred coverage for claims grounded on 
unlawful sex discrimination); Commercial Union Policy, supra note 12, (containing an 
exclusion applicable to "damages arising out of coercion, criticism, demotion, evalua­
tion, reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination or 
termination of any employee, or any personnel practices, policies, acts or omissions"). 
97. 894 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Mississippi law). 
98. Id. at 789. 
99. Id. (quoting the workers' compensation and employers' liability policy issued 
by Southern Guaranty). 
100. Id. at 791. 
101. Id. 
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claim.102 
Seminole Point Hospital Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. 103 also provides an example of a court's finding coverage for an 
employment-related claim under an EL policy. In Seminole Point, 
two employees of the hospital-EL policyholder filed suits against 
the hospital, two officer-directors of the hospital, and several other 
hospital employees, alleging failure to supervise by the hospital and 
sexual harassment by the officer-directors.104 The court held that 
no coverage was available to the officer-directors under the hospi­
tal's EL policies.105 One officer-director was denied coverage be­
cause he was not a named insured. The court determined that 
coverage for the other was precluded by the EL policy's exclusion 
for discriminatory acts and its exclusion for "bodily injury inten­
tionally caused or aggravated by [the policyholder]."106 The court 
ruled, however, that coverage was available to the hospital for the 
employee's claims of failure to supervise. Because the alleged acts 
of sexual harassment were not authorized by the hospital and not 
done to benefit the hospital, the officer-directors were acting 
outside the scope of their authority, and their intent thus could not 
be imputed to the hospital.l07 
Taking a different direction, the Iowa Supreme Court in Ot­
tumwa Housing Authority v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. ,108 held 
that a discrimination exclusion in an EL policy completely barred 
coverage for claims of sex discrimination, sexual harassment, retali­
ation, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.l09 The EL policy contained 
an exclusion for "'damages arising out of the . . . discrimination 
against any employee in violation of the law."'llo The c~urt held, 
without any discussion or analysis, that because the claimants' theo­
ries of recovery "are grounded on sex discrimination in violation of 
state and federal law," the exclusion "clearly applies."111 In so 
holding, in cursory fashion, the court seems to have been influenced 
102. Id. at 790-91. 
103. 675 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.H. 1987) (applying New Hampshire law). 
104. Id. at 45. 
105. Id. at 47. 
106. Id. at 45 (alteration in original). 
107. Id. at 47. 
108. 495 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1993). 
109. Id. at 727. 
110. Id. at 729 (quoting the employer's liability policy issued by State Farm) (al­
teration in original). 
111.. Id. 
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by its sintilar finding that the employment exclusion in the policy­
holder's general liability policy barred coverage for the same 
claims. 
2. The Contract Exclusion 
EL policies, like most other types of liability insurance policies, 
usually exclude coverage for amounts that the insured owes pursu­
ant to a contractual obligation,112 In the context of coverage for 
employment-related claims, the issue created by such language is 
whether back pay awards have been made pursuant to a contractual 
obligation. Again, judicial interpretations of such exclusions are 
mixed, but the trend is to find coverage for back pay awards, 
notwithstanding the exclusions. Although there do not appear to 
be any court decisions construing the EL policy's "contract exclu­
sion," the language of that exclusion is substantially the same as the 
contract exclusions that appear in other liability policies. 
Thus, for example, in New Madrid County Reorganized School 
District No.1, Enlarged v. Continental Casualty Co. ,113 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that an E&O 
policy's contract exclusion did not bar coverage for back wages 
awarded in connection with a suit alleging violations of employees' 
civil rights because the suit was not purely a contract action.114 
On similar facts, in School District for City of Royal Oak v. 
Continental Casualty Co. ,115 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit recognized that "an exclusion of liability insurance 
coverage for contractually assumed obligations to third parties is 
operative only where the insured would not have been liable to the 
third party absent the insured's agreement to pay."116 The Sixth 
Circuit rejected the insurer's argument that the contract exclusion 
barred coverage because the applicable collective bargaining agree­
ment prohibited certain types of discrimination, the employee did 
not sue the policyholder for breaching that agreement, and the 
claims in her complaint against the policyholder did not depend on 
the agreement.117 
Similarly, in Andover Newton Theological School, Inc. v. Conti­
112. See, e.g., Commercial Union Policy, supra note 12. 
113. 904 F.2d 1236 (8th Cir. 199O). 
114. Id. at 1241. 
115. 912 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 199O) (applying Michigan law). 
116. Id. at 847. 
117. Id. 
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nental Casualty CO.,l1S the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit determined that the contract exclusion did not bar cov­
erage of liability for age discrimination pursuant to the ADEA, de­
spite a jury's finding that the employee's employment contract was 
breached. The court ruled that the exclusion was inoperative be­
cause the imposition of liability on the policyholder pursuant to the 
ADEA "did not depend on the existence of an underlying contract, 
but only on the existence of an ongoing employment 
relationship. "119 
On the other hand, in Continental Casualty Co. v. Anne Arun­
del Community College,12° the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit upheld a jury's determination that this exclusion 
barred coverage for a back pay award for civil rights violations, rea­
soning that although the exclusion's applicability to back pay 
awards was ambiguous, there was enough extrinsic evidence of the 
parties' intent in the record to permit the jury's determination. l21 
The court of appeals declined to detail the evidence of the parties' 
intent upon which the jury based its determination.122 
II. COVERAGE FOR EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CLAIMS UNDER 
ERRORS AND OMISSIONS POLICIES (INCLUDING 
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY 
POLICIES) 
Like EL policies, there is no standard form E&O policy.123 
Hence, E&O policies include language that differs more or less 
markedly from insurer to insurer. Nonetheless, because a number 
of issues recur in E&O coverage litigation, certain generalizations 
can be made about the employment-related claims coverage af­
forded by E&O policies. These issues include: (a) who is insured 
under a policy; (b) what amounts to a claim made against the in­
sured; (c) whether an E&O policy covers claims of intentional dis­
crimination against the insured; (d) whether the insured's liabilities 
are "damages" under the policy; and (e) whether the E&O policy's 
"contract exclusion" bars coverage for back pay awards. This sec­
118. 930 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying Massachusetts law). 
119. Id. at 94. 
120. 867 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying Maryland law). 
121. Id. at 803-04. 
122. Id. at 804. 
123. See International Risk Management Institute, Inc., DIREcrORS AND OF­
FICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE CoVERAGE ANALYSIS X.E.I. (1990) (hereinafter, "IRI, 
D&O Coverage"). 
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tion discusses each of the first three issues as they arise in the con­
text of coverage for employment-related claims. Issues (d) and (e) 
above arise under policy language substantially the same as that 
used in EL and other types of policies, and therefore, should be 
resolved in a similar manner under E&O policies.124 
A. The Insured Issue 
A typical insuring agreement in an E&O policy provides: 
The Company shall pay on behalf of the Insured Person all loss 
for which the Insured Person is not indemnified by the Insured 
Organization and which the Insured Person becomes legally obli­
gated to pay on account of any claim made against him, individu­
ally or otherwise ... for a Wrongful Act committed, attempted, 
or allegedly committed or attempted, by the Insured Person 
125 
E&O policies also often provide complementary coverage for any 
losses that an insured organization incurs in indemnifying its direc­
tors or officers. The following language is typical of such comple­
mentary insuring agreements: 
This policy shall reimburse the Company for Loss arising from 
any claim or claims which are first made against the Directors or 
Officers ... for any alleged Wrongful Act in their respective ca­
pacities as Directors or Officers of the Company, but only when 
and to the extent that the Company has indemnified the Direc­
tors or Officers for such Loss ... ,126 
Notably, these insuring agreements provide coverage only for 
liabilities arising out of claims of wrongful acts made against "in­
sured persons" or "directors and officers." With respect to E&O 
policies that include such language, a claim against an organization 
or entity only may not be covered under the policy. 
For example, in Olympic Club v. Those Interested Underwriters 
at Lloyd's London,127 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's determination that under 
California law and the language of certain E&O policies issued to 
124. See supra parts 1.A.3. and I.B.2 for a discussion of these issues. 
125. Chubb Insurance Company, Executive Liability and Indemnification Policy, 
14-02-0494 (January 1985), reprinted in IRI, D&O Coverage, supra note 123, at XE.2. 
126. National Union Fire Insurance Company, Directors and Officers Insurance 
and Company Reimbursement Policy 47353 (August 1988), reprinted in IRI, D&O 
COVERAGE, supra note 123, at X.E.3. 
127. 991 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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the Olympic Club, there was no coverage for the Club's defense 
costs associated with suits alleging race and gender discrimination 
by the Club and fifty unnamed "Doe defendants." The court re­
jected the Club's argument that a claim of unlawful discrimination 
against the Club necessarily was a claim against the Club's officers, 
directors, or employees.128 The court reasoned that the Club's dis­
criminatory policies could have been carried out by its members 
rather than its officers, directors, or employees;129 that neither the 
complaints against the Club nor the Club's by-laws established who 
created the Club's allegedly discriminatory policies;130 and that the 
complaints were made against the Club itself, not against the Club 
as principal of its directors, officers, or employees under a theory of 
imputed liability.131 The court also rejected the Club's argument 
that because one of the underlying complaints alleged that the 
Club's discriminatory acts were performed by the "defendants," in­
cluding the fifty unnamed "Doe defendants," that complaint gave 
rise to the insured persons' potential liability for the alleged dis­
criminatory acts.132 
The court's denial of coverage for defense costs does not rest 
easily with the well-established California rule that the duty to de­
fend is activated if there is any potential for coverage for the allega­
tions in a complaint.133 The Ninth Circuit apparently ignored that 
rule when it denied coverage, based in part, on its finding that the 
complaint's "ambiguous" identification of the "Doe defendants" 
did not "establish" that those unnamed defendants were the Club's 
directors, officers, or employees. l34 
The premise underlying the holding in Olympic Club-namely, 
that when an E&O policy provides coverage only for the wrongful 
acts of an organization's directors, officers, or employees it does not 
also provide coverage to the organization for its own wrongful 
acts-may have been correct. However, as the dissent noted, the 
majority's decision was more likely a reaction to the "Club's unsym­
pathetic stance"135 as an alleged perpetrator of unlawful discrimina­
128. Id. at 500. By endorsement, the policies at issue covered "losses" from 
wrongful acts done by the Club's officers, directors, or employees. Id. at 499. 
129. Id. at 500. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 500-01. 
132. Id. at 501. 
133. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 274, 419 P.2d 168, 174-75 (1966). 
134. Olympic Club, 991 F.2d at 501. 
135. Id. at 507 (Reinhart, J., dissenting). 
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tion, than the product of careful interpretation of the policies, the 
complaints, and the applicable law. 
B. The "Claim" or "Suit" Issue 
As indicated by the insuring agreements set forth in the previ­
ous subsection, E&O policies typically provide defense or indem­
nity coverage for "claiins" or "suits" against insureds. These terms 
occasionally are defined in. E&O policies. For example, an E&O 
policy form used by Aetna Casualty and Surety Company defines a 
"claim" as an "adjudicatory proceeding in a court of law or equity 
brought against any of the Insured Persons which seeks actual mon­
etary damages or other relief and which may result in a loss under 
this Policy, including appeal from such adjudicatory proceeding."136 
When the term "claim" or "suit" is not defined by policies, insurers 
often argue that an informal complaint or the institution of an ad­
ministrative action against an insured does not constitute a "claim" 
or a "SUit."137 In such cases, courts have construed those terms con­
sistently with the hornbook rules of policy construction that the un­
defined terms of an insurance contract are to be given their plain 
and ordinary meanings138 and that insuring agreements are to be 
construed liberally and in favor of coverage.139 
The implications of this approach are potentially significant. In 
some cases, coverage is promoted by a finding that an administra­
tive action or other demand is a "claim" or "suit," while in other 
cases it is not. When the underlying demand, claim, or suit was 
made or brought and whether the policy is an occurrence or claims­
made policy are the principal factors influencing whether policy­
holders or insurers will argue whether a demand, claim, or suit con­
stitutes a "claim" or "suit" as these terms are found in a policy. 
136. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Designated Insured Persons and 
Company Reimbursement Policy, F-1458-a (November 1986), reprinted in, IRI, 0&0 
Coverage, supra note 123, at V.E. 34. 
137. Virtually the same issue arises dramatically under CGL policies in environ­
mental insurance coverage cases. Courts have overwhelmingly held that potentially re­
sponsible party ("PRP") letters, which commence administrative proceedings by federal 
or state environmental agencies against policyholders, are "suits" which activate the 
duty to defend. See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Md. 758, 769, 
625 A.2d 1021, 1026-27 (1993); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity and Quar. 
Co., 407 Mass. 689, 695, 555 N.E.2d 576, 581 (1990); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Indus­
trial Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., 326 N.C. 133, 153-54,388 S.E.2d 557, 570 (1990); but see, 
e.g., Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16,20 (Me. 1990) (determining 
that a clean-up order issued to a policyholder by a state agency was not a "suit"). 
138. See ApPLEMAN, supra note 15, § 7384, at 70-74. 
139. [d., § 7401, at 197. 
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Thus, for example, in Community Unit School District No.5 Coun­
ties of Whiteside and Lee v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 140 an 
Illinois intermediate appellate court determined that a complaint 
filed with the ("EEOC") and the Illinois Fair Employment Practice 
Commission alleging that an E&O policyholder engaged in race 
and sex discrimination against a disappointed job applicant and 
seeking money damages· and injunctive relief was a "civil suit" 
within the coverage of an E&O policy.141 Apparently, the term 
"civil suit" was not defined in the pOlicy.142 In reaching its determi­
nation, the court recognized that because the terms "claim" and 
"suit" are both commonly understood to mean "an attempt to gain 
legal redress or to enforce a right"143 and because the common 
meanings of "claim" and "suit" are not restricted to "legal actions 
in the common law courts,"144 proceedings before administrative or 
quasi-judicial tribunals are "claims" or "suits." 
In contrast, in Bensalem Township v. Western World Insurance 
Co. ,145 a federal district court, interpreted the undefined policy 
term "claim" in a claims-made policy and considered whether a let­
ter from the EEOC to an E&O policyholder requesting certain in­
formation and notifying the policyholder that a charge of age 
discrimination had been filed against it was not a "claim" under the 
E&b policy. The court reasoned that because the EEOC's letter 
did not demand anything from the policyholder, it was not a 
"claim," as that term is commonly understood.146 The EEOC letter 
and information request was made prior to the inception of the pol­
icy at issue.147 A later, more explicit demand from the EEOC was 
asserted during the policy period, and the court found that this de­
mand constituted a "claim" within the meaning of the policy.148 
Thus, the court ruled, the policy provided defense coverage for the 
later "claim."149 
C. Intentional Discrimination 
In the context of employment-related claims, a claim of inten­
140. 95 III. App. 3d 272, 419 N.E.2d 1257 (1981). 
141. Id. at 279, 419 N.E.2d at 1261-62. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 279, 419 N.E.2d at 1261. 
144. Id. 
145. 609 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
146. Id. at 1349. 
147. Id. at 1347. 
148. Id. at 1349. 
149. See, e.g., ApPLEMAN, supra note 15, § 7401, at 197. 
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tional discrimination, or "disparate treatment," involves an allega­
tion that an employer intentionally treated an employee less 
favorably than other employees on the basis of a protected classifi­
cation, e.g., race, religion, nationality, or sex.150 Courts have deter­
mined that the definition of "Wrongful Act" in E&O policies 
permits coverage for claims of disparate treatment. "Wrongful 
Act" is often defined as: "any actual or alleged error, misstatement, 
misleading statement, act or omission, or neglect or breach of duty 
by the Directors or Officers in the discharge of their duties solely by 
reason of their being Directors or Officers of the Company."151 
Courts finding coverage under this language have reasoned 
that such language must be enforced as written, and that insurers 
that do not want to provide coverage for acts of intentional discrim­
ination could have drafted the definition of "Wrongful Act" to state 
that expressly, or could have excluded such intentional acts from 
coverage explicitly.152 
The above-quoted policy language has been distinguished from 
another typical definition of "Wrongful Act," which provides cover­
age only for "negligent" acts, errors, omissions, misstatements, or 
misleading statements. Certain courts interpreting this definition of 
"Wrongful Act" have determined that such language bars coverage 
for claims of intentional discrimination.153 
III. CONCLUSION 
Employers of all types and sizes have faced, and will continue 
to face, an onslaught of employment-related claims. Traditional 
150. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 
n.15 (1977). 
151. CNA Insurance Company, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Pol­
icy, G-11126-4 (October 1983), reprinted in IRI, D&O COVERAGE, supra note 123, at 
X.E.4. 
The definition of "Wrongful Act" set forth above may not permit coverage for 
claims made against "directors or officers" by virtue of their conduct outside their ca­
pacities as directors and officers. See Bowie v. Home Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 705, 708-09 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (affirming district court's determination under California law that an E&O 
insurer had no duty to defend its policyholder's directors in a suit filed against them in 
connection with their capacities as directors of another company). 
152. See, e.g., New Madrid County Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. I, Enlarged v. 
Continental Casualty Co., 904 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Missouri 
law); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697, Eveleth v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 515 
N.W.2d 576, 580 (Minn. 1994). 
153. See, e.g., Golf Course Superintendants Ass'n v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 
London, 761 F. Supp. 1485,1489-90 (D. Kan. 1991) (applying Kansas law); School Dist. 
No.1, Multnomah County v. Mission Ins. Co., 58 Or. App. 692, 701, 650 P.2d 929, 935­
36 (1982). 
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types of liability insurance purchased by employers, including EL 
insurance and E&O insurance, often provide coverage for such 
claims. Employers would do well to ascertain the extent to which 
their EL and E&O policies may provide coverage for the employ­
ment-related claims that have been or might be, made against them 
before deciding to bear the cost of such claims themselves or 
purchasing additional (and perhaps unnecessary) insurance to se­
cure such coverage. 
